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PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 10-2893
___________
SECRETARY OF LABOR,
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,
Petitioner
v.
CONOCOPHILLIPS BAYWAY REFINERY,
Respondent

______________
On Appeal from the Occupational Safety and Health Review
Commission
(OSHRC Docket No. 07-1045)
__________
Argued
July 12, 2011
___________
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Before: SLOVITER, FUENTES and GARTH, Circuit Judges.
(Opinion Filed: August 16, 2011)

Gary K. Stearman (Argued)
U.S. Department of Labor
200 Constitution Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20210
Counsel for Petitioner
Dennis J. Morikawa (Argued)
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP
1701 Market St.
Phila, PA 19103
Counsel for Respondent
___________
OPINION OF THE COURT
___________
GARTH, Circuit Judge:
In this appeal, although ConocoPhillips Bayway
Refinery is the real party in interest, we are asked to decide
between different interpretations of agency regulations—the
one announced by the Secretary of Labor, the other by the
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission. Both
entities are part and parcel of the Department of Labor. In
this appeal, because two factions within the same government
agency disagree with each other over the application of a
standard, we are thrust into resolving what is essentially an
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internal dispute. We do so here, and hold that the Secretary's
interpretation comports with the standard we established in
Secretary of Labor v. Trinity Industries, 504 F.3d 397 (3d Cir.
2007).1
I.
The Secretary of Labor (“Secretary”) petitioned this
Court to challenge the determination of the Occupational
Safety and Health Review Commission (“Commission”) that
nine asbestos violations by ConocoPhillips Bayway Refinery
(“Conoco”) were “not serious” rather than “serious” under 29
U.S.C. § 666. The Secretary originally cited Conoco for nine
“serious” violations of the asbestos in construction standard,
29 C.F.R. § 1926.1100, under the Occupational Safety and
Health Act (“Act”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678.
The
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) affirmed all of the
violations and upheld the classification of the violations as
“serious.”
The Commission thereafter reduced the
classification of the nine violations to “other-than-serious,” in
part because the Secretary failed to present case-specific
evidence of possible employee exposure to asbestos.
1

“[The Occupational Safety and Health Administration] separates enforcement
and rulemaking powers from adjudicatory functions. The Secretary is charged
with the responsibility for setting and enforcing workplace safety standards.
[She] is empowered to issue authoritative interpretations of the statute and „has
the sole authority to determine whether to prosecute a violation of the Act.‟”
Reich v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n, 998 F.2d 134, 137
(3d Cir. 1993) (citing Cuyahoga Valley Ry. Co. v. United Transp. Union, 474
U.S. 3, 5 (1985)). “The Commission, on the other hand, is assigned to carry out
adjudicatory duties . . . In performing its tasks, the Commission reviews the
Secretary‟s interpretation only for reasonableness and consistency with statutory
and regulatory language.” Id. “Stated simplistically, the Secretary is entrusted
with the enforcement and interpretation of law and the Commission with making
findings of fact.” Id.
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We conclude that the Commission misapplied this
Court‟s precedent in Secretary of Labor v. Trinity Industries,
504 F.3d 397 (3d Cir. 2007). We will therefore vacate the
Order of the Commission, and remand to the Commission
with the direction that the citations be affirmed as “serious”
and that the penalty for the violations be reconsidered.
II.
A.
Pursuant to the Act, the Secretary shall promulgate
occupational safety and health standards. 29 U.S.C. § 655.2
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(“OSHA”), an agency within the Department of Labor, helps
the Secretary promulgate these standards. OSHA regulates
asbestos exposure at 29 C.F.R. §§ 1926.1101 (construction
standard) and 1910.1001 (industry standard), and has
determined that asbestos is a harmful substance. E.g.
Occupational
Exposure
to
Asbestos,
Tremolite,
Anthophyllite, and Actinolite, 51 Fed. Reg. 22,647-48,
22,698 (June 20, 1986) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1910);
Occupational Exposure to Asbestos, 59 Fed. Reg. 40,967,
40,979 (Aug. 10, 1994) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1910).
B.
2

Because the various asbestos terms which we employ throughout this opinion
are known by their acronyms, we furnish this glossary:
ACM = Asbestos Containing Material
PACM = Presumed Asbestos Containing Material
TSI = Thermal System Insulation
PEL = Permissible Exposure Limit
f/cc = fiber per cubic centimeter of air

4

The construction standard (“Standard”), the regulation
at issue in this case, prescribes certain protective requirements
based on the measurable concentration of asbestos fibers to
which employees are or may be exposed, and contains a
second set of specific requirements that apply regardless of
the level of exposure.
The Standard sets a permissible exposure limit (PEL)
of 0.1 fiber per cubic centimeter of air (f/cc), and imposes
certain assessment and monitoring requirements to ensure that
no employee is exposed to an airborne concentration of
asbestos in excess of this limit.3 29 C.F.R. § 1926.1101(c).
This PEL represents the lowest exposure level that can be
reliably measured. 59 Fed. Reg. 40,967. The Standard
recognizes a significant risk even under a PEL of 0.1, and in
order to reduce that risk to the extent practicable, the Standard
has taken an approach of adding certain protective provisions
based on the kind of operations being regulated. 59 Fed. Reg.
40,968. See also id. 40,967 (acknowledging that the 0.1 f/cc
level “leaves a remaining significant risk”). Additionally,
measured levels of exposure “often fail to define risk,” and
with regard to removal work (the type of work at issue in this
case), “highly variable amounts of asbestos are generated.”
Id. 40,968. Therefore, the Standard requires such employees
to be protected in order to assure each asbestos worker is
exposed to the lowest feasible level. Id. The mandated work
practices are important because they “assure that each
asbestos worker is exposed to the lowest feasible level.” Id.
40,969. “The operations for which mandatory work practices
3

Of note, the PEL is not equivalent to the percentage of asbestos that a
particular material contains. For example, a mastic may be 20% asbestos, but
the PEL may be under 0.1.
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are required would otherwise result in employee exposure
that is significant.” Id.
The Standard classifies asbestos work activities into
four classes, of which only Class I and Class II are relevant in
this appeal.
Class I asbestos work refers to activities involving the
removal of TSI (thermal system insulation), surfacing ACM
(asbestos containing material) and PACM (presumed asbestos
containing material). 29 C.F.R. § 1926.1101(b).
Class II asbestos work consists of the removal of ACM
which is neither TSI nor surfacing material—for example,
asbestos-containing wallboard, floor tile and sheeting and
construction mastics. Id.
The work at issue in this case falls into Class II.
Protective requirements for Class II work include: the
establishment of a regulated area (§ 1926.1101(e)(1)); the use
of respirators (§ 1926.1101(h)); in the absence of a negative
exposure assessment, the use of protective clothing (§
1926.1101(i)(1));
and
training
of
employees
(§
1926.1101(k)(9)(iv)(C)).
All employers with workplaces covered by the
Standard must conduct an initial exposure assessment before
or at the beginning of an operation to ascertain expected
exposures of asbestos. 29 C.F.R. § 1926(f)(2). For Class I
asbestos work, “until the employer conducts exposure
monitoring and documents that employees on that job will not
be exposed in excess of the PELs,” the employer shall
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presume that employees are exposed in excess of the limit.
Id. § 1926(f)(2)(ii).
Violations of OSHA standards are characterized as
“willful,” “repeated,” “serious,” or “not serious” (referred to
by the Commission as “other-than-serious”). See 29 U.S.C. §
666. A violation is “serious” if:
[T]here is a substantial probability that death or
serious physical harm could result from a
condition which exists, or from one or more
practices, means, methods, operations, or
processes which have been adopted or are in
use, in such place of employment unless the
employer did not, and could not with the
exercise of reasonable diligence, know of the
presence of the violation.
Id. § 666(k). “Serious” and “not serious” violations are both
subject to civil penalties of up to $7,000. A penalty is
mandatory for “serious” violations. Id. § 666(b),(c).
C.
Conoco operates a refinery in Linden, New Jersey. In
September 2006, Conoco determined that an underground
pipeline installed in the early 1950s was leaking gasoline and
needed to be partially replaced. The gas line, 14” in diameter,
was housed inside a 20” protective pipe (“the sleeve”), which
was coated with a tar-like substance (“the mastic”). Conoco
did not initially test the mastic to determine whether it
contained asbestos. Conoco also failed to perform an initial
exposure assessment before removing a portion of the sleeve
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and cutting into the mastic. Three Conoco mechanics worked
with the pipe without taking all of the precautions mandated
by § 1926.1101. One Conoco mechanic used a hammer and
chisel for about thirty minutes to chip an approximately 5”
band of mastic from around the circumference of the sleeve.
A second mechanic then cut through the sleeve where the
mastic had been removed with a torch for another thirty
minutes. A third Conoco mechanic held the sleeve in a sling
while it was torched. These activities were performed
without using wet methods to control exposures and without
establishing a regulated area. The mechanics did not use or
wear specialized equipment or clothing.
On September 18, 2006, Conoco began an
investigation into potential employee exposures resulting
from the work performed on the underground pipe. Conoco
established an investigation team consisting of two union
representatives and two Conoco management employees.
The team decided to conduct a mock test on an intact portion
of the pipe sleeve to determine whether exposure to airborne
asbestos fibers could have occurred. The test attempted to
replicate the work that the employees working on the sleeve
had conducted. The investigation report stated that the mock
testing results showed no detectible levels of airborne
asbestos in the breathing zone samples. (J.A. 218-23.) The
Secretary disputed the validity of this testing before the ALJ,
but the ALJ determined that the mock testing was not invalid.
(J.A. 33-34.) However, the ALJ also determined that there
“is no reason to conclude that no asbestos was released during
the cited work and that there was no exposure to asbestos
fibers.” (J.A. 35.) Rather, the ALJ found it “more likely than
not that asbestos fibers were released during the cited work
and that exposure to asbestos occurred.” (Id.) The ALJ did
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determine, based in part on the testing and the low levels of
fibers detected, that the likelihood of injury was low. (Id.)
After OSHA conducted an inspection of the refinery,
the Secretary, on March 8, 2007, cited Conoco for the
following violations:
Failing to determine the presence, location and
quantity of ACM and to notify employees of this
information prior to beginning work, pursuant to §
1926.1101(k)(2)(i) and (ii).
Failing to conduct an initial exposure assessment
before cutting into the mastic, pursuant to §
1926.1101(f)(2)(i).
Failing to use engineering controls and work practices
in the form of wet methods, pursuant to §
1926.1101(g)(1)(ii).
Failing to establish a regulated area, pursuant to §
1926.1101(e)(1).
Failing to provide the proper respiratory protection
equipment, pursuant to § 1926.1101(h)(3)(iii)(A).
Failing to require the use of protective clothing,
pursuant to § 1926.1101(i)(1).
Failing to use warning signs, pursuant to §
1926.1101(k)(7)(i).
Failing to train employees, pursuant to §
1926.1101(k)(9)(iv)(A).
Improperly disposing of waste material, pursuant to §
1926.1101(l)(2).
4
(J.A. 246-54.)

4

J.A. refers to Joint Appendix.

9

The Secretary classified all the violations as “serious”
and proposed a penalty of $2,500 for each.
D.
The ALJ affirmed all of the violations, and upheld the
classification of the violations as “serious.” She found that
the work involved was Class II work, and further found that
the Secretary met her burden of proving that the 20”
protective pipe sleeve and surrounding mastic contained
more than 1% asbestos, and found that Conoco‟s own testing
established the presence of asbestos levels far higher than 1%,
for example at 20% and 25%. (J.A. 20-21, 23.)
The ALJ additionally found that Conoco had
“constructive knowledge” of the violative conditions, and
made the following factual findings: (1) the refinery‟s
Management Procedure recognized that many areas in the
refinery contain asbestos, and devotes 17 pages to asbestos
hazards; (2) Conoco was aware that underground pipes often
contain asbestos, and the refinery‟s 2005 and 2006 fact sheets
stated that asbestos could still be found in the refinery; (3)
Conoco Bayway‟s asbestos training stated that asbestos was
widely used between 1940 and 1975; and (4) “the subject
sleeve was known to have been installed in the 1950‟s.” (J.A.
27-28.) She noted additionally that the preamble to the
asbestos standard indicates that asbestos is used as a filler for
tar-based surface coatings, which are used as protective
coatings for underground pipelines. (J.A. 28, citing 59 Fed.
Reg. 40,964, 41,028.)
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Finally, the ALJ reduced the proposed penalty to
$1,875 for each violation, in part because Conoco‟s mock
testing revealed a low likelihood of injury. (J.A. 32-35.)
E.
On review, the Commission reduced the classification
of the violations to “other-than-serious,” and the total penalty
from $16,875 to $3,150. (J.A. 4.)
The Commission noted that it was “undisputed that the
tar-like coating around the pipe‟s sleeve contained between 2
and 25 percent asbestos,” but asserted that the Secretary
“must show that the work performed on the particular
material involved in this case . . . could have generated, and
exposed Conoco employees to, a harmful amount of
asbestos.” (J.A. 4-5.) The Commission faulted the Secretary
for failing to present any case-specific evidence, and for
relying solely “on how the asbestos in construction standard
and its regulatory history address Class II work.” (J.A. 5.)
The Commission concluded that there was a possibility in this
case that the work performed did not have the potential to
generate and expose Conoco employees to a harmful amount
of asbestos, and that therefore the Secretary had not
established that Conoco‟s violations were “serious.” (J.A. 6.)
The Secretary timely petitioned this Court for review.5
III.
Pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act
(“APA”), this Court may set aside the legal conclusions of an
5

The Commission had jurisdiction over the enforcement proceeding pursuant to
29 U.S.C. § 659(c). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 660(b).
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agency body if they are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(a)(2); Trinity, 504 F.3d at 400. The Court “must defer
to an agency‟s reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous
statute.” Trinity, 504 F.3d at 400 (citing Reich v. D.M. Sabia
Co., 90 F.3d 854, 856 (3d Cir. 1996)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Issues of pure law, such as whether the
agency properly applied a legal standard set out by this Court,
receive plenary review. See Broome v. U.S. Dept. of Labor,
870 F.2d 95, 99 (3d Cir. 1989).
“In those instances in which the Secretary of Labor‟s
interpretation differs from the interpretation of the
[Commission], the Court must defer to the Secretary‟s
reasonable interpretation.” Trinity, 504 F.3d at 400. “[T]he
Secretary is entrusted with the enforcement and interpretation
of law.” Reich, 998 F.2d at 137.
IV.
The Secretary argues that under the Trinity standard,
the violations in this case are “serious.” She maintains that
she was not required to proffer case-specific evidence to
demonstrate the seriousness of the violations here, as the
Commission held, largely because the regulations support a
presumption that Class II work exposes employees to
significant amounts of asbestos.
A.
Although Trinity involved Class I work, it guides our
analysis here. In Trinity, the company had work done on a
furnace that required removing material classified as PACM.
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Trinity believed that any asbestos present had been removed
and that new insulation would be asbestos-free, and thus did
not conduct tests to determine if asbestos was present. The
ALJ upheld two violations under § 1926.1101(k), but
reclassified the violations as “not serious.” 504 F.3d at 400.
The Secretary claimed on appeal that this was error
and that the violations should have been classified “serious.”
504 F.3d at 399-400.
We affirmed the Secretary‟s
classification. Id. at 401.
In Trinity, we set a standard that we apply to determine
whether many asbestos violations are “serious.” See 504 F.3d
at 401. Initially, we explained that “[i]t is well-settled that,
pursuant to § 666(k) „when the violation of a regulation
makes the occurrence of an accident with a substantial
probability of death or serious physical harm possible, the
employer has committed a serious violation of the
regulation.‟” Id. (citing Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. OSHRC,
607 F.2d 1069, 1073 (3d Cir. 1979) (emphasis in original)).
We held that the ultimate question was whether, “as a result
of the failure to test and notify, it was possible that an
accident could occur in which it was substantially probable
that death or serious physical harm would result.” Id.
(emphases added). As such, demonstrating actual exposure to
asbestos was unnecessary. Id.; see also Walmart Stores, Inc.
v. Sec’y of Labor, 406 F.3d 731, 736 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(holding that actual conditions at work site are beside the
point because the issue was whether employees could have
been seriously injured).
Conoco and the Commission attempt to distinguish
Trinity by focusing on Trinity‟s statement that where asbestos
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is “presumed to be present,” a failure to test is
“unquestionably serious.” Id. Potential for exposure, which
is the focus under the standard, is not dependent upon
whether the material is ACM or PACM—both can and do
lead to exposures above the PEL or to exposures below the
PEL that are still harmful.
The Commission distinguished Trinity based on the
differences between Class I work, at issue in Trinity, and
Class II work, at issue in this case. (J.A. 6.) Yet, Trinity
placed no emphasis on the type of work involved. Further,
while Class I work is sometimes presumed to result in a
concentration over the limit—i.e., definite exposure to
asbestos—Class II work can still lead to asbestos exposure
even if the concentration is under the permissible limit. See
59 Fed. Reg. 40,968-69, 40,978, 40,982.
Thus the
Commission acted contrary to Trinity and thus to our declared
standard in relying on a distinction between Class I and Class
II work.
Trinity‟s standard only requires that there could be
exposure to asbestos that is substantially probable to lead to
serious harm. Applying this standard, Conoco‟s violations
were “serious.”
B.
The Commission held, and Conoco argues, that the
Secretary must put forth case-specific evidence showing that
the employees could have been exposed to harmful asbestos
and thus that the violations were serious. The Commission‟s
determination is contrary both to the standard in Trinity and
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to the asbestos construction standard,
constitutes an abuse of discretion.

and therefore

The Commission held that to demonstrate that the
violations in this case were serious, “the Secretary must show
that the work performed on the particular material involved in
this case . . . could have generated and exposed Conoco
employees to a harmful amount of asbestos.” (J.A. 5.) This
holding ignores the Standard‟s presumption that violations of
Class II asbestos requirements expose employees to
substantial amounts of asbestos. See 59 Fed. Reg. 40,968-69.
The violations in this case largely involved requirements for
work practices and engineering controls that are applicable to
Class II asbestos work without regard to whether exposures
exceed the PEL. Under the regulations, the Standard
indicates that Class II work generates “significant” employee
exposure to asbestos. See id. (noting that the “operations for
which mandatory work practices are required would
otherwise result in employee exposure that is significant” and
that concentrations below the 0.1 f/cc are harmful;); see also
59 Fed. Reg. 40,978, 40,982 (observing that reducing
exposure to 0.1 f/cc does not eliminate significant risk since
“a still significant risk remains below the PEL”).
The Commission reasoned that the regulations did not
establish how far below the PEL a risk extends, and that Class
II work is not presumed to generate any particular PEL. (J.A.
6.)
The Commission thus concluded that there is a
“possibility” that the work in this case “may not have had the
potential to . . . expose” employees to a harmful amount of
asbestos, and that therefore the Secretary had not met her
burden. (Id.)
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Thus, the Commission, by its own holding, admits that
there is a possibility that the work may have actually exposed
employees to a harmful level of asbestos, which is all that this
Court‟s standard requires. The Commission misapplied the
Trinity standard in seemingly requiring the Secretary to
negate the possibility that employees may not have been
exposed to harmful asbestos. Rather, the Secretary must
simply demonstrate the possibility of such exposure.
We therefore conclude that demonstrating the
possibility of harmful exposure to asbestos does not require
case-specific evidence under this Court‟s standard, where the
Secretary demonstrates that (1) employees engaged in a
particular type of asbestos work, (2) the work at issue is
presumed to generate significant employee exposure to
asbestos under the regulations, (3) the employer had actual or
constructive knowledge of the violative conditions, and (4)
regulations were violated.
C.
Finally, we address Conoco‟s argument that under the
Secretary‟s proposed standard, almost any violation of a
regulation where harmful asbestos is present would be a
“serious” violation. We acknowledge that under the Trinity
standard, in combination with the asbestos construction
Standard and its accompanying regulations, many violations
of asbestos regulations relating to Class II asbestos will be
presumptively “serious.” But no bright-line rule has been
established.
First, it is not the case that the Secretary demonstrates
a violation of any asbestos regulation and ipso facto the
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violation is classified as “serious.” Class II asbestos work is
limited to removal of materials that contain more than 1%
asbestos.
The Secretary pointed to regulations which
established a presumption that Class II work generates
significant employee exposure. This presumption, which may
not exist for all classes of work, aided the Secretary in
meeting her burden of showing that exposure to harmful
asbestos was possible. In a different case, the Secretary will
again be required to show that such a presumption exists, or
demonstrate in some other way that exposure could occur.
Second, the Secretary indicates that certain violations,
such as deviations from requirements relating to
recordkeeping and housekeeping, may not be classified as
“serious.”
Third, the Secretary must always show that the
employer had actual or constructive knowledge of the
violative conditions. See Sec’y of Labor v. Astra Pharm.
Prods., Inc., 9 BNA OSHC 2126, *4 (Jul. 30. 1981) (aff’d in
part and remanded in part, Astra Pharm. Prods., Inc. v.
OSHA, 681 F.2d 69 (1st Cir. 1982)) (“In order to prove a
violation of section 5(a)(2) of the [Occupational Safety and
Health] Act, 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(2), the Secretary must show
by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) the cited standard
applies, (2) there was a failure to comply with the cited
standard, (3) employees had access to the violative condition,
and (4) the cited employer either knew or could have known
of the condition with the exercise of reasonable diligence.”)
(emphasis added).
Such requirements place limits on the types of work
and on the employers that can be held accountable for an
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asbestos violation. In this case, the ALJ found that Conoco
had “constructive knowledge” of the violative conditions—
that the sleeve coating contained asbestos—and made
findings based on evidence which demonstrated Conoco‟s
constructive knowledge. (J.A. 27-28.)
Fourth, although we hold that the Secretary is not
required to proffer case-specific evidence of potential
exposure to satisfy this Court‟s standard, we point out that the
employer is always permitted to rebut by evidence which
demonstrates that there was no possibility of exposure. For
example, an employer could show that the asbestos in this
case was protected in a way that it could never have been
released, and thus there was zero chance of exposure. Such
evidence could serve the purpose of rebutting the
presumption in the regulations. Essentially, where the
Secretary has shown violations of regulations involving Class
II work and the presence of asbestos, it will shift the burden
to the employer to show that the violations were not
“serious.”
V.
We conclude that under Trinity, the violations in this
case were “serious,” and that the Secretary is not required to
proffer case-specific evidence to meet Trinity‟s standard. We
therefore vacate the Order of the Commission, and remand to
the Commission with the direction that it affirm the citations
as “serious” and reconsider the penalty for the violations in
light of this opinion.

18

